Consciousness, which has lacked a 'hard-wired' and 'evolutionary' explanation up to now seems to be getting a lot of attention. I recently bought and read 'The Biology of Transcendence: A Blueprint of the Human Spirit' by Joseph Chilton Pearce. This is only one of many 'scientific' studies of consciousness published in recent days.
I imagine the rush of such theories as these is another of those races to be the first to solve an outstanding conundrum in science. Many books of this kind are, as I see it, attempts by reductionists to surmount their last Everest; to square the circle and complete their mechanistic map of the universe.
I am convinced that there are only two possible answers to consciousness and that one of them, which may be characterized either as the 'hard wired,' the biological, or the reductionist, is wrong. The obvious answer, in my view, is that consciousness is beyond reductionist explanation. This has been the case, in my opinion, since Arthur Koestler wrote 'Beyond Reductionism' in 1956. Nevertheless our scientists will persist in looking for their Holy Grail, always inside the reductionist box.
The first reductionist explanation may have come from Pablov. If you remember, he conditioned his dogs to associate the ringing of a bell with food. After sufficient conditioning – that is, after the experimenter repeatedly rang a bell and immediately presented the dogs with food – the dogs automatically began salivating on hearing the bell alone. A great deal of animal behavior is no doubt 'conditioned' behavior where the animal has learned to associate two events. We make the same sorts of associations, and we say that one 'causes' the other. Some associative pairs are learned and others are 'instinctual' it seems.
Anything amiss here?
It should not take a genius to spot a false link here, but apparently brilliant minds do. The association between an event and the response of a sentient animal is NOT one of cause & effect as is the case of mixing two chemical compounds and producing a chemical reaction for example. To take the case of Pablov's dogs. The sound of the bell does NOT physically cause the dogs to salivate. It is the MEANING of the bell which does so. If it were simply the sound of the bell which caused the animals to salivate, then any bell at any time, and well before they were 'conditioned,' would have caused them to salivate. But that was not the case. It was only after the canines had learned that the bell MEANT food, that they began salivating.
So we are not dealing with a cause and effect relation here, but with sentient animals capable of interpreting events in relation to their own needs and selves. Furthermore, if pooches have needs, then surely the critters must have selves capable of recognizing an 'I' which experiences need. So we have discovered that these dogs are conscious, which is to say self-conscious!
Small wonder that reductionists failed to make this same discovery until lately, for it has always posed a threat likely to blow their case out of the water. But it now appears that they have accepted the principle that animal behavior is largely conscious. How else to explain the cowboys of the Lazy-R (Reductionist) ranch in such a hurry to get a lasso on this rogue steer (consciousness) in order to drag it back into the mechanist corral?
We can shed light on the nature of consciousness by taking another approach, and here I quote from a thoughtful fellow named Howard Katz.
'Take take a young child into the kitchen and show him the eating utensils. He will observe that, although the forks are different from each other (perhaps in size, material of construction or color or at least in occupying a different space at the same time), they have certain similarities. If you hold one up and say, “This is a fork,” the child will get the concept. You can then go into a different house (in a different city), tell the child to fetch a fork, and he will be able to comply. Further, you can do this with very large numbers of children, and they will pretty much all get it right. This is because all the children have noticed the essential similarities (which all forks have with each other) and the essential differences (which all forks have with all non-forks) We say the child now has the concept 'fork.' Thus these similarities and differences cannot be arbitrary. It must be that the child is perceiving something in reality, not performing an arbitrary act like naming something.'
Yes, the concept is not the name, and you have to ask: Where did the concept came from? Concepts exist nowhere but in the mind or in consciousness. Consciousness is where the Reality lies I believe.
Now, if you will hold on to the concept of a concept, I want to make a bridge to another idea, even more important. While we don't actually create objects like rocks, mountains and clouds, we nevertheless define them, which is to say, we name them and relate them meaningfully to other objects (which we also define) according to location in time and space and according to likeness and difference. Thus while the world of objects is not our creation, the world order IS. This is a fact dramatically illustrated by a story which I will tell in a moment. The world order we create or project is a matrix of meanings. If something means something in relation to something else, then it is for no other reason than we put the meaning or the relation there. Thus if we see a cause-and-effect relation, it is a cause-and-effect relation only because we choose to see that 'A' CAUSES 'B'.
It appears to be the fact that every single thing in the universe is connected to every other thing. Chaos theory tells us that the flap of a butterfly's wing is, in some part, responsible for triggering a hurricane in the Gulf. For any given outcome the causes are countless. (There are to say, many 'hidden variables.') We choose to see only the cause/effect relations which are both accessible to our senses (or instruments) and ones which accord with our latest ideas about how the world is ordered. Thus while the theory of evolution, or quantum theory, and any theory (but not a mathematical theorem) that you care to name satisfies us that we have an objective grasp of the Reality, no such theory is more than a useful and convenient explanation projected onto an inscrutable canvas. Science lays claim to 'objectivity.' Like the religionists whom they ridicule, it appears that scientists are prey to their own myths as well.
There can be no opposition between subjectivity and objectivity when subjectivity is all there is . It is the Concept – the product of a human subjectivity – that is the only objective fact we are ever likely to know. The objects of real interest are not those lying in that 'real' world conjured up by scientists. There is only one OBJECT of consuming interest, it seems to me, and that is the faculty (consciousness) which first distinguished these same objects in a web of likeness/difference relationships.
Inuit children can be taught to distinguish twenty kinds of snow and to associate a different word with each of these twenty different kinds. An Aboriginal child, on the other hand, has no word for snow. Consequently, snow is not a part of his reality. Thus snow is not an named object before it is an idea or concept. Our scientists have it the other way around. The object exists and then we name it. They are simply wrong.
Here is the story I promised. It is a paraphrase by John Alexandra (author of 'Mephistopheles' Anvil') of lines from Oliver Sach's book: 'An Anthropologist on Mars.'
In his most recent book, 'An Anthropologist on Mars,' Sacks pre-
sents the case of a blind man, Virgil, whose visual perception was
restored by surgery. Virgil, who had lost his sight when he was
six, had worked many years for the YMCA, which provided him
with a house. At 'fifty, he was about to be married, and his fiancee
wanted him to have an operation to restore his sight. ''Wouldn't it
be wonderful, she reasoned, ''if the first things he saw were the church, his
bride and the wedding?” He agreed, and the operation was surgi-
cally successful.'
When the bandages were removed, the room was vibrant with
expectation. Virgil, however, did not cry out for joy. Contrary to all
expectations, he continued to stare blankly and with bewil-
derment at a world upon which he could not focus. Virgil later
told Sacks that in that first moment he could see light, movement
and color, but had no idea what he was seeing -- it was all only a
'confused, meaningless blur.'
All involved (including Virgil himself) expected that, after the
operation, he would simply open his eyes and see the world of ob-
jects -- an expectation based on the naive view that these objects
are ''as we see them.'' What had been forgotten? The complicated
cognitive processes we developed as infants, seemingly effort-
lessly, which are essential to creating a meaningful world of ex-
perience.'
Without them our sensations remain only a confusing
maze of light, movement and color. Sacks designates Virgil
''mentally blind'' -- able to perceive with his eyes but not able to de-
cipher what he was seeing as meaningful objects. Having no con-
cept of perspective, he could not distinguish distance. He would
think objects were on top of him when they were still distant. He
found shadows confusing since he could not yet form the concept
of objects blocking light. He would stop at or try to step over the
shadow. Sunlit steps, combining perspective, shadow, solidity and
perspective, were overwhelmingly difficult. He could not dis-
tinguish whether dark areas were solid or shadow, closer or more
distant, horizontal or vertical.'
Virgil now experienced tremendous confusion when trying to
navigate his way through the house he had lived in for many
years. He could only walk through the house in a predetermined,
fixed line. He had to perceive everything in a constant way. If he
deviated from this line, he became totally disoriented. since the
same objects (a table or bench, for instance) looked completely
different from other viewpoints, and so were unrecognizable. Only
slowly did he learn to see and recognize the objects in the room
from other vantage points. He had similar difficulty grasping the
idea of a cat. He could distinguish a cat's paw. its nose. tail or
ear, but could not form the integrated concept needed to see the
cat as a whole. To think-and therefore see-even the most
seemingly obvious'' relationships (obvious to the sighted person,
that is) was an enormous struggle for him.'
Sacks points out that, in similar operations since the first doc-
umented case in 1728, nearly all the patients had also experi-
enced the most profound confusion and bewilderment. As seeing
adults, we take for granted the concepts of distance. space,
shadow and the enormous visual transformation of the appear-
ance of objects from different perspectives. We can scarcely
imagine Virgil's confusion. We developed the complicated cognitive
activity that allows us to see visual objects during the uncon-
sciousness of our early childhood. At a very early stage of devel-
opment, we too were like newly-sighted persons, for whom space
and distance did not exist. We would reach out to touch the
moon. When young children begin to develop the cognitive activity
that transforms their meaningless sensations into a meaningful
world of experience, they have many advantages the older newly-
sighted person has lost. '
A telling story, don't you think?
What Alexandra calls 'cognitive processes' and 'cognitive activity' is what I would call Consciousness. And this faculty or agency is the faculty or agency which, as Alexandra says, 'transforms meaningless sensations into a meaningful world of experience.'
Now, it is clear to me that 'the meaningful world of experience' is neither the objective world of Newtonian science nor the probablistic one of quantum mechanics. It is instead the imaginative invention of human consciousness.
Let's take another look at what Alexandra has to say.
'Since reductive science has adapted the world to suit its re-
search methods, and adopted certain preconceptions that facili-
tate such research, our present capacity to see the world is re-
stricted by these preconceptions. As a result, the quality of the
light reductionism generates is also limiting -- although differently
limiting than the Church's light. Mechanistic science's light re-
duces the reality and color of the world to gray and black shad-
ows. Havel, Hammarskjold and Solzhenitsyn, among others, call
on us to learn to see the world in its full garb of color, beauty and
richness, by developing the ideas to understand this richness as it
is. Developing a light of this kind, by avoiding the limiting
preconceptions of reductive science, is the pivotal challenge for a
postmodern renaissance.'
It is Consciousness which supplies us with the constructs and theories by which we order, assign meanings to, and make sense of our sensations and measurements. Thus any attempt to explain consciousness in terms of a biological theory or any other theory that is a product of consciousness is doomed to failure even before it begins. A shoe cannot explain the cobbler. It is that simple.
Furthermore, for a thing to exist, surely there must exist its negation. For every state, there exists necessarily an equal and opposite state; and this symmetry holds not only in the case of Newtonian action and reaction, but matter and anti-matter, energy and mass, motion and space-time warp, and so on. For every shoe a cobbler makes, there is a shoe he didn't make. This shoe which he didn't make is the mental blueprint or conscious counterpart of the shoe he did make. The blueprint or conscious counterpart is, in effect, what brought the shoe he made into existence. While we can account for the tangible shoe in terms of an idea in the head of its conscious maker, how do we account for the faculty or agency which produced the idea? How do we account for singularities such as this; for things without the counterpart which the rule of symmetry demands? There is the rub.
Consciousness has NO counterpart. This mysterious entity is the end point of a regression or compression. It is the end of the line beyond which we cannot know or go.
I go again to the workface.
If the scientists now publishing 'Consciousness' books had read Godel, Chaitan, Penrose, or even 'recursive epistemologist,' Bateman, and taken on board their proofs as well as the conclusions to be drawn from chaos theory, they would not be proposing 'hard-wired' solutions to consciousness, evolutionary theories of the brain, or organic explanations of spirituality.
These people fail to see that they lack the right answers. First of all consciousness is not a behavior. It is not the behavior of an organ such as the brain nor is it the motions of some as yet to be discovered psychic particle. These folk seem to forget that explaining my behavior – internal and external -- is not the same as explaining me, my identity, my purposes, or Why am I here? It is all very well to posit a positron or a gluon because without it your conceptual model will not work and produce the predictions you want, but another thing entirely to confuse a conscious human being with the behavior of neurons deployed in networks in a brain.
But confusing behavior with identity is only the first mistaken step made by our reductionist farriers, busy at their forges shaping metal to suit the hooves of their theories. Their second and far greater error is to fail to get to grips with the central problem of consciousness which is how to account for the entity (a conscious one) which can regard, order, and run itself.
Typically, a reductionist will resort to the slipshod argument that: I know myself to exist by the fact that I see myself in the bathroom mirror, in the eyes of my lover, named in the account of a bank holdup in the newspaper, or pictured at a celebrity gathering photographed for a spread in 'Hello' magazine. All these evidences only confirm that the material and behaving body is/was there. We do not see our real selves in any of these mirrors. We only see perceptions, not the perceiver. A conscious agent (by definition) knows itself to BE without the help of any mirrors. Nevertheless, in a culture where material evidences are the only proof of identity, it is entirely understandable that the principle should extend to the Self as well.
When I say material evidences are the ONLY proof of identity in our culture, I don't believe I am exaggerating. Look at the cult of celebrity, at logos on clothing, at social networking, at the vast and oppressive array of security measures which set out to map every individual to a finger print, digital facsimile of a face, speech pattern, credit rating, police record, network card serial number, tax number, credit card number, etc. Identity in the post modern age is a cluster of identifying marks employed for purposes of social control. Why don't they just stamp an indelible bar code on our foreheads at birth and be done with it?
There are no MATERIAL/BEHAVIORAL evidences of the agency which projects an order upon the material world. The material world, so far as we know, it is our projection, as even the quantum people would assert. As individuals, we know the world as it is interpreted by our various senses and organs. What we know and experience is something we construct. If we had the sensory equipment of an alligator or an otter, we would doubtless construct and know a different world altogether.
A radar system or cat-scan apparatus constructs a 'reality' according to its special sensory equipment. We do likewise with the sensory equipment we possess. Our 'radar' system is physical and operates according to electro-chemical principles. Although reductionists are forever confusing the two, our radar system is NOT that agency which brings US individually (we who are NOT a cluster of behaviors exhibited by a corporeal body) into existence. It is this agency which monitors the output of sensors such as fingers and eyes and it is this agency which conceives of the reasons, models, and theories to explain sense data. The data delivered by neural pathways or chemical messengers contains no meaning and no meaning or interpretation is bestowed upon it by any of the organs of the body. Consciousness is the agency responsible for making sense of the data, for consciousness provides a Self to which the data can be meaningfully referred. Without a Self as a reference, all the sense data in the world is meaningless.
Sense data is only meaningful when it changes something in me or in what might be called the domain of ME. The sense data cannot be responsible for ME for they cannot be both the subject and the object of interpretation. Data (which is always 'code') requires a separate interpreter if it is to gain meaning. Likewise, it is impossible to reason axioms from their corollaries. Recursion simply does not work. It is impossible to explain the perceiving agency (ME) by reference to the objects and order I perceive in the world. Yes we know what the perceiver (Consciousness) is doing. It is ordering our experience of a material world. What we cannot do is say that the perceiver is also a part of that same order (bio-electrical, quantum, etc.) which it is projecting upon the world. Even a movie projector cannot be in the picture it is projecting. Is this so difficult to understand?
Apparently so.